Who Is a (Non-Final) Authority in Philosophy?

By Tore Boeckmann

Tore Boeckmann’s* commentary was posted on the Internet in 2007 and despite being a response to particulars of the day, his theme is not only relevant to the mission of Checking Premises, it is also timeless. He identifies the implicit subjectivism in some Objectivists’ belief that recognizing authority is a breach of independence, and that ultimately it is hostility to knowledge and to those who possess it.

Objectivity demands that if you are only barely familiar with a field, you do not criticize, question, pontificate to or write about distinguished authorities (i.e., experts) in that field without, at the very least in some manner of FORM, taking the difference of knowledge into account . . . . This is a rule of human interaction observed by most literate people . . .

Independence requires objectivity, and objectivity requires acknowledgment of facts. One such fact is that human beings differ in knowledge, and are not all equal participants in some cosmic internet bull-session. Recognition of this fact does not make one a second-hander. It is a prerequisite for being a first-hander.

And in terms of one’s values, the following holds true: one cannot logically profess a love of wisdom (philosophy) in the abstract, while showing nothing but hostility to wisdom in the concrete.

Mr. Boeckmann also suggests that unmoderated Internet discussion groups are a poor way to learn Objectivism and gives advice on the proper way. This advice ought to be helpful to the novice Objectivist.—Chip Joyce

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A couple of years ago, a question was raised on Harry Binswanger’s moderated email list: Is participation in unmoderated internet discussion groups a good way to learn the philosophy of Objectivism? I replied that it was not (though I didn’t claim it could not have any value). The effective way to learn Objectivism, I indicated, was from experts in the field: first reading Ayn Rand’s books, then listening to lectures by Dr. Peikoff, taking classes from Dr. Ghate [at the Objectivist Academic Center]–or participating in email lists moderated by an authority on the philosophy like Dr. Binswanger. I made the point that any instruction one receives from others must be accompanied by one’s own independent thinking. And I contrasted this approach (to learning Objectivism) with participation in internet forums with a very low general level of understanding.

My old statement has been dug up by Stephen Speicher, who replies thusly on his “The FORUM”: “Any man who uses reason and whose frame-of-reference is reality possesses the key to understanding Objectivism–or anything. Those who would have us defer to ‘intellectual superiors’ and ‘genuine authorities’ instead of reason and reality, are dead wrong.”

The subjectivism and anti-intellectualism of Speicher’s reply is obvious. In his view, to recognize some individual as an expert in a field, and to seek to learn from him, is ipso facto to “defer” to authority and to abandon reason and reality. (Otherwise, what is the relevance of his reply to my original statement?) As Ayn Rand describes this mentality: “Only a subjectivist, who equates facts with arbitrary assertions, could imagine that to ‘learn’ means to ‘accept on faith.’” (“Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?”)

It is interesting that Speicher should associate the idea of teachers being authorities with the idea that they are the “intellectual superiors” of their students–which may be, but is not necessarily, true (in any sense more fundamental than knowledge of a specific subject matter). He even puts this phrase in quotation marks, as if it came from me, which it did not. (The one time I recall using this phrase is in a recent discussion, not of the relationship of students to teachers, but of the resentment and envy of a mediocrity toward his betters.) In combination with Speicher’s characterization of learning from experts as “deferring” to them, this view of being a student as being an intellectual inferior makes one think that he regards learning as humiliating.

Speicher’s mentality is common enough to merit a response. Take the following example (also relating to Speicher)–a small one, but symptomatic of the wider error.

Robert Mayhew recently published his article “What Went Wrong with [Robert] Tracinski’s Account of the Ancient Greeks?” He included the following sentence: “Thales predicted an eclipse–something inconceivable on the mythological world view, which held eclipses to be omens from the gods (and in one archaic poem, proof of the feebleness of man’s mind).” Speicher replies . . . that while he was “glancing through Mayhew’s article,” he “stumbled over a couple of apparent discrepancies in Mayhew’s ‘correcting [of] Tracinski’s presentation.’” He went on: “The last paper I read on this (Thales’ Eclipse, A.A. Mosshammer, Transactions of the American Philological Association, Vol. 111, pp. 145-155, 1981) made a very strong case in demonstrating ‘how fictional the story of Thales’ prediction is.’” Based on this, Speicher “can’t help but wonder what corrections are necessary for correcting Mayhew’s ‘correcting [of] Tracinski’s presentation.’”

Of course, it is irrelevant to Mayhew’s thesis whether Thales successfully predicted an eclipse–or merely tried to, and had the reputation, in the classical period, for having done so. But let us leave that aside and ask what is going on with Speicher’s reply. He skims, not reads, Mayhew’s article. He spots a reference to Thales’ having predicted an eclipse. This raises a question in his mind, and he goes, presumably, on Google and searches for Thales+eclipse. The TAPA article is the third hit [note that it is, as of this publication, the fifth hit]. Speicher reads (skims?) the article, sees that it concludes against Thales having predicted an eclipse, and uses it (as “the last paper I read on this”) to snidely question Mayhew’s scholarship.

Now, there is a large scholarly controversy over this matter, of which Speicher knows nothing and Mayhew knows everything. As Jonathan Barnes, in The Presocratic Philosophers, says of the many scientific achievements attributed to Thales (including the eclipse): “the heated controversy they have aroused will deter all but the most reckless from advancing an amateur opinion.” Wise words; but not to Speicher. He is quite prepared to conclude that Mayhew’s “claim appears to be historically inaccurate, factually untrue.” On his premise, to recognize any distinction between a professional and his own amateur opinion is an affront.

Observe also the irony of the second-handed nature of Speicher’s disagreement with Mayhew. It is based on no fact, evidence, or argument–except for Mosshammer’s view. Speicher simply appeals to a rival authority, with no indication of why one is better than another, except his own subjective preference.

When Mayhew indicated, on Dr. Binswanger’s list, that he would not be answering Speicher’s criticism, considering its ignorant and insulting nature, Speicher reacted with extreme hostility. He wrote on his own forum, referring to Mayhew: “We are well aware that there are those who would like Objectivists to unquestioningly take them on faith and hate those who won’t, but they don’t dare say that publicly. Some are cowards who give pseudo-reasons for their hatred and then refuse to answer questions about their attacks.”

There is no reason to believe that Mayhew wants anyone to take him on faith, or hate those who don’t. All one can surmise is that he demands of potential interlocutors a minimum level of politeness–and of objectivity. Objectivity demands that if you are only barely familiar with a field, you do not criticize, question, pontificate to or write about distinguished authorities (i.e., experts) in that field without, at the very least in some manner of form, taking the difference of knowledge into account.

This is a rule of human interaction observed by most literate people. But not by Stephen Speicher. He doesn’t defer to anyone’s authority! No sirree, Bob! Who is this Mayhew dude to think he knows more than Speicher about Thales and the eclipse? So what if Mayhew has spent decades studying Greek philosophy, as opposed to a few minutes on Google? No one knows anything better than Speicher does, and reality, incarnated as Mosshammer’s article, is his only frame of reference!

There are many interesting questions relating to the broader issue of how to judge objectively who is an authority in a field, and when and in what manner to be guided by the greater knowledge of others, while maintaining one’s intellectual independence. Such questions come up in one’s relationship to doctors, garage mechanics — and teachers.

But independence requires objectivity, and objectivity requires acknowledgment of facts. One such fact is that human beings differ in knowledge, and are not all equal participants in some cosmic internet bull-session. Recognition of this fact does not make one a second-hander. It is a prerequisite for being a first-hander.

And in terms of one’s values, the following holds true: one cannot logically profess a love of wisdom (philosophy) in the abstract, while showing nothing but hostility to wisdom in the concrete.


* Mr. Boeckmann is not affiliated with Checking Premises, however, at the time of this publication, he lets it be known that he supports what we are doing.


(DISCLAIMER: The expressed opinion is not necessarily endorsed by members of Checking Premises.) 

Copyright © 2012 Tore Boeckmann, All Rights Reserved.